The SABAN Center at BROOKINGS Plan For Regime In SYRIA Memo

The SABAN Center at BROOKINGS Plan For Regime In SYRIA Memo (March 2012) (By: Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Kenneth Pollack, and Salman Shaikh) lays out six options for the United States to consider to achieve Asad’s overthrow, should it choose to do so. These are:

1. Removing the regime via diplomacy;

2. Coercing the regime via sanctions and diplomatic isolation;

3. Arming the Syrian opposition to overthrow the regime;

4. Engaging in a Libya-like air campaign to help an opposition army gain victory;

5. Invading Syria with U.S.-led forces and toppling the regime directly; and

6. Participating in a multilateral, NATO-led effort to oust Asad and rebuild Syria.

 The memo considers option 6 as the Goldilocks Solution

 Option Six: International Intervention: The Goldilocks Solution?

One variant on the invasion option that bears separate consideration because it could prove to be an attractive alternative is for NATO to invade Syria with Arab League diplomatic support and ideally some Arab military participation. UN authorization would be desirable, but given Russian opposition would probably not be forthcoming. Invading forces would depose the Asad regime, impose a ceasefire on the warring parties, and provide security for a long term, international effort to rebuild Syria. The closest model here would be the NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995—although it would differ in at least one critical respect since there would be no Dayton Peace Accords to precede it.

 In a nutshell, NATO would have to agree to mount the invasion and then provide the military means to enforce the peace and protect a UN-led multilateral effort to rebuild the country. A key consideration would have to be that the UN would lead the kind of reconciliation talks between Sunni and Alawi in Syria that never occurred in Iraq. Likewise, NATO forces would have to remain for as long as necessary, even if in diminishing numbers, to ensure the Alawis and Syria’s other minorities that they would not be oppressed by the majority Sunni community (again, as NATO did in Bosnia, but the United States did not do for long enough in Iraq). In essence, NATO would depose the Alawis and other minorities and then work to protect them from a possibly vengeful majority.

 Four conditions would have to be met for this model to be workable:

 1. Turkey would have to be willing to provide the logistical base and much of the ground troops for the operation. Turkey is best placed of any country to intervene in Syria: it has a large, reasonably capable military; it has vital interests in Syria; and its interest is in seeing peace and democratic transition. However, this condition may pose difficulties because the Alawis do not trust the Sunni Turks, and Ankara might like to see a Muslim Brotherhood-led government take power in Syria. Turkey would also be reluctant to spearhead an invasion because it would not want to significantly change Syria’s Kurds’ status, fearing unrest in Turkey itself. Of equal or greater importance, the long-term occupation and reconstruction of Syria would likely be well beyond Turkish resources alone. Thus, while Turkey would need to be a key player—perhaps the key player, as Australia was in the similar intervention in East Timor—it cannot be the only player; it will need financial help and multilateral assistance and cover.

 2. The Europeans and the Gulf Arabs have to be willing to pick up much of the tab. As noted above, rebuilding Syria after the events of 2011 and an invasion and occupation will be a major undertaking. Even if the reconstruction of Syria benefits from all the lessons learned in Iraq and suffers from none of its mistakes, it will still be enormously costly and well beyond Turkey’s means. Consequently, even though Turkey would be needed to put up much of the raw military muscle, it would be a mistake to ask them to shoulder the costs of that burden.

 3. The United States will have to be willing to provide critical logistical, command and control, and some combat components. As always, there are certain things, particularly leadership, strategic direction, mobility assets, and certain precision strike capabilities that only the U.S. armed forces know how to provide and that if Washington is not willing to offer, the operation would likely falter. Along similar lines, if the United States does not furnish some ground forces, no one else will either, and American troops may be critical to reassure the Syrians that the Turks will not run amuck—something they will fear regardless of whether it is a reasonable concern. In addition, as noted, because of the United States’ experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are a lot of Americans with useful skills who can contribute to pacification and reconstruction in Syria.

 4. The operation must be conducted under a multilateral—if not international framework. NATO participation (as in Libya, Bosnia, and Kosovo) is essential because it creates the appropriate framework both for Turkish intervention and for Western assistance alongside Turkey. Arab League participation would be extremely helpful both as a source of additional (Arabic-speaking) ground troops and to legitimize the invasion in the eyes of both the Syrian people and the wider region. Ideally, the UN Security Council would authorize the mission, or at least provide a special representative of the secretary-general to internationalize the reconstruction effort, bringing in scores of other countries and non-governmental organizations that have resources and skills that will be sorely needed for that effort. If the United States is willing and able to secure these various conditions, the international intervention approach has numerous benefits.

Of greatest importance, it would cost the United States much, much less than mounting an invasion itself, but would have far, far greater certainty of achieving American goals than any of the other options. However, securing any of these four conditions could prove impossible. The Russians have shown every sign that they would fight tooth and nail to prevent any UN mandate for such an operation. It is also not clear that the Turks are ready to make so large a commitment (although the worse things get in Syria, the more likely they probably would be since their own list of options looks even less appealing than our own). Western Europe and the United States are mired in severe economic difficulties, and the only time that the Arab states were willing to pick up the tab for a major Western military operation in the Middle East was the 1991 Gulf War. Thus, as attractive as this option might be, it will ultimately prove very hard to implement.

 

The memo lays down the following conclusion

Conclusion

No option for U.S. policy for Syria is simple or costfree. All are flawed, some quite deeply. A number of the easiest options to implement, such as diplomacy and coercing regime change, also are the most likely to fail or succeed incompletely. Others, like having opposition forces act alone or with U.S. support, might put more pressure on Asad but are potentially costly and by no means guaranteed of success. For now, some options—particularly an American invasion—are not in the cards politically in the United States and are not being called for by Syrians, regardless of their (debatable) desirability. Recognizing a range of options is vital, however, because in practice many of the options slip easily into one another and, indeed, policymakers are likely to mix components of each. The diplomatic approach, for example, could bolster all of the other options: the United States will want to build coalitions, try to flip the Russians, and otherwise use its diplomatic power if is trying to coerce or use force to get Asad out. Similarly, all the military options would be enhanced if the United States also continued economic pressure on the Asad regime. Such mixes may mitigate some of the problems described with each option above, yet trying to mix and match aspects of different options will often bring on new sets of costs and disadvantages.

Some of the options can be considered steps on an escalation ladder—some should be tried because they are less costly than more aggressive measures, and others should be pursued because they will be a component of a broader effort.

Several steps are vital for almost any conceivable effort to oust Asad. The United States will want to build within the “Friends of Syria” a smaller contact group, regardless of which approach is taken. Indeed, should Asad not fall, this group would also be vital for containing the spillover from a Syrian civil war. In addition, the United States will want to expand ties to the Syrian opposition and try to push them to be more cohesive. A stronger opposition will not only bolster the policy options, it will be critical to the shared goal of all the options. It is the opposition that will play a greater role even if there is only limited regime change, and of course would be the government of Syria should Asad and his henchman fall completely. Finally, U.S. regional allies, particularly Turkey, are vital. They will play a major role in determining how tight sanctions are and the degree of isolation felt by the regime. Because of their proximity to Syria, they are also essential to various military options, even if they themselves do not take the lead.

 Policymakers should recognize, however, that diplomacy and coercion alone may not topple Asad. The options in this paper offer alternatives for escalation and, at the same time, reasons that escalation would be costly and risky. In the end, policymakers may decide that the price for removing Asad is too high and the consequences for Syria’s long-term stability too uncertain. If so, they must focus on the problem of a weakened but defiant Asad who is also more dependent on Iran. This would require thinking through how to structure sanctions on Syria and regional diplomacy to limit the humanitarian impact on the Syrian people while still maintaining pressure on the Syrian regime.

Whether Asad stays or falls, the civil war in Syria may spill over into neighboring states, which requires efforts to shore them up and try to reduce the scale and scope of the civil conflict. So even as the United States pursues regime change, it must also work to bolster neighboring states to care for refugees, prevent terrorism, and refrain from self-defeating interventions.

 As a final thought, it is always important to keep in mind that failing to act—even failing to decide—is an action and a decision. Not choosing to intervene is the same as choosing not to intervene, and it would be far better that whatever course the United States follows, that it be the product of a conscious decision so that we can pursue it properly, rather than the outcome of a paralyzing indecision that prevents Washington from doing anything to protect this country’s many interests affected by the bloodshed of Syria.

 

Read the full memo

PS: In 2002, the Brookings Institution founded the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, named after Haim Saban, an Israeli-American media proprietor, who donated $13 million toward its establishment. Saban has stated of himself, “I’m a one issue guy, and my issue is Israel”, and was described by the New York Times as a “tireless cheerleader for Israel.” The Centre is directed by AIPAC’s former deputy director of research, Martin Indyk.