The SABAN Center at BROOKINGS Plan For Regime In SYRIA Memo (March 2012) (By: Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Kenneth Pollack, and Salman Shaikh) lays out six options for the United
States to consider to achieve Asad’s overthrow, should it choose to do so.
These are:
1. Removing the
regime via diplomacy;
2. Coercing the
regime via sanctions and diplomatic isolation;
3. Arming the
Syrian opposition to overthrow the regime;
4. Engaging in a
Libya-like air campaign to help an opposition army gain victory;
5. Invading Syria
with U.S.-led forces and toppling the regime directly; and
6. Participating in
a multilateral, NATO-led effort to oust Asad and rebuild Syria.
The memo considers option 6 as
the Goldilocks Solution
Option Six:
International Intervention: The Goldilocks Solution?
One variant on the invasion
option that bears separate consideration because it could prove to be an attractive
alternative is for NATO to invade Syria with Arab League diplomatic support and
ideally some Arab military participation. UN authorization would be desirable,
but given Russian opposition would probably not be forthcoming. Invading forces
would depose the Asad regime, impose a ceasefire on the warring parties, and
provide security for a long term, international effort to rebuild Syria. The
closest model here would be the NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995—although it
would differ in at least one critical respect since there would be no Dayton
Peace Accords to precede it.
In a nutshell, NATO would have to
agree to mount the invasion and then provide the military means to enforce the
peace and protect a UN-led multilateral effort to rebuild the country. A key
consideration would have to be that the UN would lead the kind of
reconciliation talks between Sunni and Alawi in Syria that never occurred in
Iraq. Likewise, NATO forces would have to remain for as long as necessary, even
if in diminishing numbers, to ensure the Alawis and Syria’s other minorities
that they would not be oppressed by the majority Sunni community (again, as
NATO did in Bosnia, but the United States did not do for long enough in Iraq).
In essence, NATO would depose the Alawis and other minorities and then work to
protect them from a possibly vengeful majority.
Four conditions would have to be
met for this model to be workable:
1. Turkey would have to be willing to provide the logistical base and much
of the ground troops for the operation. Turkey is best placed of any country to intervene in
Syria: it has a large, reasonably capable military; it has vital interests in
Syria; and its interest is in seeing peace and democratic transition. However, this
condition may pose difficulties because the Alawis do not trust the Sunni
Turks, and Ankara might like to see a Muslim Brotherhood-led government take
power in Syria. Turkey would also be reluctant to spearhead an invasion because
it would not want to significantly change Syria’s Kurds’ status, fearing unrest
in Turkey itself. Of equal or greater importance, the long-term occupation and reconstruction
of Syria would likely be well beyond Turkish resources alone. Thus, while Turkey
would need to be a key player—perhaps the key player, as Australia was in the similar
intervention in East Timor—it cannot be the only player; it will need financial
help and multilateral assistance and cover.
2. The Europeans and the Gulf Arabs have to be willing to pick up much of
the tab. As noted above,
rebuilding Syria after the events of 2011 and an invasion and occupation will be
a major undertaking. Even if the reconstruction of Syria benefits from all the
lessons learned in Iraq and suffers from none of its mistakes, it will still be
enormously costly and well beyond Turkey’s means. Consequently, even though
Turkey would be needed to put up much of the raw military muscle, it would be a
mistake to ask them to shoulder the costs of that burden.
3. The United States will have to be willing to provide critical
logistical, command and control, and some combat components. As always, there are certain
things, particularly leadership, strategic direction, mobility assets, and certain
precision strike capabilities that only the U.S. armed forces know how to
provide and that if Washington is not willing to offer, the operation would
likely falter. Along similar lines, if the United States does not furnish some
ground forces, no one else will either, and American troops may be critical to
reassure the Syrians that the Turks will not run amuck—something they will fear
regardless of whether it is a reasonable concern. In addition, as noted,
because of the United States’ experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are a
lot of Americans with useful skills who can contribute to pacification and
reconstruction in Syria.
4. The operation must be conducted under a multilateral—if not international framework. NATO participation (as in Libya,
Bosnia, and Kosovo) is essential because it creates the appropriate framework
both for Turkish intervention and for Western assistance alongside Turkey. Arab
League participation would be extremely helpful both as a source of additional (Arabic-speaking)
ground troops and to legitimize the invasion in the eyes of both the Syrian
people and the wider region. Ideally, the UN Security Council would authorize the
mission, or at least provide a special representative of the secretary-general
to internationalize the reconstruction effort, bringing in scores of other
countries and non-governmental organizations that have resources and skills
that will be sorely needed for that effort. If the United States is willing and
able to secure these various conditions, the international intervention approach
has numerous benefits.
Of greatest importance, it would cost the United States
much, much less than mounting an invasion itself, but would have far, far
greater certainty of achieving American goals than any of the other options.
However, securing any of these four conditions could prove impossible. The Russians
have shown every sign that they would fight tooth and nail to prevent any UN
mandate for such an operation. It is also not clear that the Turks are ready to
make so large a commitment (although the worse things get in Syria, the more
likely they probably would be since their own list of options looks even less
appealing than our own). Western Europe and the United States are mired in
severe economic difficulties, and the only time that the Arab states were
willing to pick up the tab for a major Western military operation in the Middle
East was the 1991 Gulf War. Thus, as attractive as this option might be, it
will ultimately prove very hard to implement.
The memo lays down the following conclusion
Conclusion
No option for U.S. policy for
Syria is simple or costfree. All are flawed, some quite deeply. A number of the
easiest options to implement, such as diplomacy and coercing regime change,
also are the most likely to fail or succeed incompletely. Others, like having opposition
forces act alone or with U.S. support, might put more pressure on Asad but are
potentially costly and by no means guaranteed of success. For now, some options—particularly
an American invasion—are not in the cards politically in the United States and
are not being called for by Syrians, regardless of their (debatable)
desirability. Recognizing a range of options is vital, however, because in practice
many of the options slip easily into one another and, indeed, policymakers are
likely to mix components of each. The diplomatic approach, for example, could
bolster all of the other options: the United States will want to build
coalitions, try to flip the Russians, and otherwise use its diplomatic power if
is trying to coerce or use force to get Asad out. Similarly, all the military
options would be enhanced if the United States also continued economic pressure
on the Asad regime. Such mixes may mitigate some of the problems described with
each option above, yet trying to mix and match aspects of different options
will often bring on new sets of costs and disadvantages.
Some of the options can be
considered steps on an escalation ladder—some should be tried because they are
less costly than more aggressive measures, and others should be pursued because
they will be a component of a broader effort.
Several steps are vital for
almost any conceivable effort to oust Asad. The United States will want to
build within the “Friends of Syria” a smaller contact group, regardless of
which approach is taken. Indeed, should Asad not fall, this group would also be
vital for containing the spillover from a Syrian civil war. In addition, the
United States will want to expand ties to the Syrian opposition and try to push
them to be more cohesive. A stronger opposition will not only bolster the
policy options, it will be critical to the shared goal of all the options. It
is the opposition that will play a greater role even if there is only limited
regime change, and of course would be the government of Syria should Asad and
his henchman fall completely. Finally, U.S. regional allies, particularly
Turkey, are vital. They will play a major role in determining how tight
sanctions are and the degree of isolation felt by the regime. Because of their
proximity to Syria, they are also essential to various military options, even
if they themselves do not take the lead.
Policymakers should recognize,
however, that diplomacy and coercion alone may not topple Asad. The options in
this paper offer alternatives for escalation and, at the same time, reasons
that escalation would be costly and risky. In the end, policymakers may decide that
the price for removing Asad is too high and the consequences for Syria’s
long-term stability too uncertain. If so, they must focus on the problem of a weakened
but defiant Asad who is also more dependent on Iran. This would require
thinking through how to structure sanctions on Syria and regional diplomacy to
limit the humanitarian impact on the Syrian people while still maintaining
pressure on the Syrian regime.
Whether Asad stays or falls, the
civil war in Syria may spill over into neighboring states, which requires
efforts to shore them up and try to reduce the scale and scope of the civil
conflict. So even as the United States pursues regime change, it must also work
to bolster neighboring states to care for refugees, prevent terrorism, and
refrain from self-defeating interventions.
As a final thought, it is always
important to keep in mind that failing to act—even failing to decide—is an
action and a decision. Not choosing to intervene is the same as choosing not to
intervene, and it would be far better that whatever course the United States follows,
that it be the product of a conscious decision so that we can pursue it
properly, rather than the outcome of a paralyzing indecision that prevents
Washington from doing anything to protect this country’s many interests
affected by the bloodshed of Syria.
